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The importance of institutions has become a central tenet of modern macroeconomics. This is
apparent in the literature on time inconsistency in monetary policy, which sees the appointment of an
independent central bank and inflation targeting as key elements in achieving price stability (Persson and
Tabellini, 1997). In this paper we report estimates of forward-looking interest rate reaction functions
for a number of OECD economies. We demonstrate that significant changes in monetary policy
behaviour have occurred in a number of OECD economies, but that such shifts in policy are not
necessarily linked with institutional change.
Our results contrast sharply with those obtained by others ( Clarida  et al. 1998). Whilst
confirming that central bank policies became more ‘conservative’ at the beginning of the eighties (and
inflation expectations followed), we also detect some significant shifts in the subsequent conduct of
monetary policy in the USA and Japan. In addition, the introduction of inflation targeting and central
bank reforms in countries like Sweden, Canada and New Zealand has not led to major changes in the
way in which central banks of those countries react to the objectives of economic policy. Our results
suggest that institutional change has ex post confirmed the policy shift. In a way, these findings are
consistent with the view that changes in society’s attitude towards inflation - and the ensuing policies -
are relatively more important than institutional arrangements (Posen 1993, McCallum, 1996).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we outline the main contributions and results of
the paper. In Section 2, we provide a link between estimated interest rate reaction functions and the
theory of monetary policy design. This provides the background for our empirical models. Our
empirical estimates are presented in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.2
1.  Introduction: The Existing Literature and Key Results
1.1 Context: The Existing Literature
There are several recent contributions on modelling interest rate reaction functions and we need
to distinguish our contribution carefully from those of previous authors. In general three broadly
different approaches have been used in modelling monetary policy behaviour. First, a number of
researchers have used Vector Autoregressions (VARs) to estimate the way in which policy actions
depend on a set of macroeconomic indicators, and how in turn policy actions are transmitted to key
macro variables.  Bernanke and Blinder (1992) use the US Federal Funds Rate to analyse the
transmission mechanism in the US. Christiano et al. (1994), Bernanke and Mihov (1995, 1997) (inter
alia)
1 have refined this approach by analysing alternative measures of monetary policy and identification
mechanisms for the estimated VARs. Second, some researchers have focused on estimating single-
equation (structural) reaction functions for monetary policy instruments (see for instance, Groeneveld et
al., 1996, Muscatelli and Tirelli, 1996, Clarida and Gertler, 1997, and Clarida et al., 1998). Third,
Rudebusch (1995, 1996) uses data from forward-looking financial markets to construct measures of
unanticipated shocks to monetary policy.
In this paper we adopt the second of these approaches. The third approach, which uses
financial market data, is less useful in detecting major changes in the monetary authorities’ policy
behaviour and the implications of any changes for the stance of monetary policy. The VAR approach
has some advantages in that it allows one to jointly model both the endogenous policy response and the
impact it has on key macroeconomic indicators by making only minimal assumptions about the
transmission mechanism and the timing in the authorities’ reactions to new macroeconomic data.
However, the results from VAR models do seem to depend critically on the assumptions made about
                                                                
1 For an excellent survey, see Christiano et al. (1998) who analyse the advantages and pitfalls of the VAR approach
to identifying monetary shocks.3
which variables to include in the VAR, and on the existence of a time-invariant transmission mechanism
and reaction function (see Rudebusch, 1996). Given the number of variables one usually includes in a
VAR and the limited number of observations, it becomes difficult to conduct any stability analysis by,
say, using ‘rolling VARs’. This is especially the case if there have been frequent changes in either the
policy regime or in the financial system which might affect the timing of the policy response and the
nature of the transmission mechanism
2.
Indeed, as noted by Christiano et al. (1998), VAR modellers usually prefer not to report or to
interpret estimated policy rules, because if the actual policy rule is forward-looking, the estimated
coefficients of such VAR-estimated ‘policy rules’ will be difficult to interpret. Instead, VAR models are
primarily designed to construct measures of monetary policy shocks for use in analysing the
transmission of monetary shocks
3. (Even though there are differing views of the robustness and
usefulness of the monetary policy shock measures obtained from  VARs - see  Rudebusch, 1996,
Bagliano and Favero, 1998, Christiano et al., 1998). Overall, it does seem that VARs are less useful in
undertaking an empirical analysis of regime changes in the conduct of monetary policy.
1.2 Key Results and Value Added
Our focus on single-equation (forward-looking) structural reaction functions is similar to that in
Clarida and Gertler (1997) and Clarida et al. (1998), and allows us to analyse shifts in monetary policy
regimes using recursive estimation techniques. However, we extend these earlier studies in the following
ways. First, by presenting recursive estimates of these reaction functions, we can detect marked
changes over the last two decades in the way monetary policy has been conducted. This allows us to
find some new and surprising results. For instance, the announcement of explicit inflation targets and the
move to more independent central banks in several OECD economies has not led to a major change in
                                                                
2 Although Bernanke and Mihov (1995) do allow for a limited amount of time variation in their VAR model.
3 See e.g. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).4
the way monetary policy reacts
4 to the final objectives of economic policy in the 1990s. The change in
policy behaviour pre-dates the introduction of inflation targets and central bank reforms. This has
important implications for the large theoretical literature that has emerged on central bank
independence.
Second, unlike Clarida et al., we use alternative methods to estimate our measures of expected
inflation and potential output. This is based on the assumption that the private sector is imperfectly
informed about the central bank preferences, whereas the central bank is imperfectly informed about
the permanent and cyclical components of output growth (see Orphanides, 1999). Interestingly this also
leads to new results. Whilst the interest rate reaction functions for Germany is reasonably stable, there
seem to be some signs that monetary policy rules in the US and Japan are less stable than one might
have imagined over the period 1985-97. Our estimates suggest that US policy has shifted to react to
inflationary expectations more vigorously, and with a shorter lead. This fits well with most anecdotal
accounts of US policy in the 1990s, but is in sharp contrast with the results of previous empirical
studies. Moreover, we find that the output coefficient has the wrong sign in the mid-1980s, suggesting
that real interest rates were too low at a time when the output gap was positive. Only in the 1990s does
the output coefficient sign become positive once more. Our results stand in sharp contrast with those of
Favero and Rovelli (1999), who argue that since 1982 the Fed acted as a strict inflation  targeter,
rejecting the hypothesis that output stabilisation is an independent argument in the loss function of the
                                                                
4 These results are consistent with those obtained in related work by Groeneveld et al. (1996), who reject the
hypothesis of a structural break following the switch to inflation targeting in Canada, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom. However, their models are backward-looking, use mainly domestic target variables, and focus solely on
the overall stability of the fitted reaction functions during the early 1990s. Our modelling approach in this paper
examines the stability of the model parameters over a longer sample and uses a measure of expected inflation and of
potential output. There are also alternative approaches in the literature to assess the impact of inflation targets. For
instance, Freeman and Willis (1995), and King (1995) examine credibility effects on the yield curve, and Almeida and
Goodhart (1996) use a variety of different methods to assess the impact of inflation targeting on the behaviour of
monetary authorities.5
Fed
5. Japanese policy also seems to have exacerbated the cycle in the late 1980s, and only seems to
have attempted to stabilise the output gap post-1990. This confirms the suspicion that Japanese policy
was inappropriately geared to external objectives (the relationship with the US) in the 1980s.
Third, our study provides some empirical evidence on the lead with which the expected inflation
rate enters estimated reaction functions. This is of considerable interest to theoretical analyses of the
trade-off between output and inflation variability in monetary policy design (see Haldane and Batini,
1998, Goodhart, 1999). There is no other empirical study that we are aware of which compares the
forward-lookingness of monetary policy across OECD countries.
2.  Interest Rate Reaction Functions and the Theory of Monetary Policy Design
In this section we show how a forward-looking interest rate reaction function can emerge from
a simple Barro-Gordon-type theoretical model of monetary policy design. Consider the following
model for current inflation in the presence of costly price-adjustment as in Calvo, (1983) or Rotemberg
(1983) ( Rotemberg and  Woodford, 1998, propose a sticky-price model which has similar
implications):
p bp j t t t t
e
t p p y y = - = + - - + 1 1 ( *)  (1)
where current inflation, p depends on inflation expectations and the current output gap, where y* is
potential output. The output gap is given by:
y y s R R t t t
e
t - = - - + * e (2)
Output deviations from the natural rate depend on a supply shock,  e t, and the deviations of the
nominal interest rate Rt (which is the policy instrument), from its expected value, Rt
e.
                                                                
5 They estimate a model of the US economy using a VAR specification for the output gap, inflation and a commodity
price index over the period 1960-1998. By doing this they estimate the parameters in the aggregate demand and
supply functions. Then they use GMM methods to estimate, over the period 1983-1998, an interest rate rule which
allows to identify the Central bank desired trade-off between output and inflation. Their approach requires full




e = + + * p 1 (3)
where r* is the (ex ante) real interest rate.
Following Svensson (1998), suppose that the monetary policy-maker’s loss function is given by:
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
2
1 1
2 2 ) ( ~ * - - + - + - + - = t t t t t t R R R E R y y L r r p p c (4)
where the authorities penalise not only deviations of output from an output target,  ~ y , which exceeds
the natural level y* (as in Barro and Gordon, 1983), and of inflation from a target p* (as in Svensson,
1997a), but also penalise deviations and changes in the policy instrument.
This formulation assumes that stabilisation policy via interest rate changes is costly, and that for
this reason shocks are never fully stabilised in the long run. Svensson’s (1997a) model highlights the
risk of instability of an anti-inflationary policy by assuming that the policymaker penalises deviations of
Rt from zero. Instead the formulation in (4) assumes that the policymaker knows the level of inflationary
expectations, and consequently chooses a sequence for Rt. However, in the event of shocks hitting the
economy, the authority decides whether to deviate from the nominal interest rate implied by the state of
inflationary expectations. Solving the model under discretion, so that the monetary authority minimises
(4) with respect to the nominal interest rate, taking expectations as given, yields an interest rate reaction
function:
R wr A b c d R t t
e
t t = - + + + + - * * * * * p e 1 1 (5)
where the coefficients are:
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Note that we need the interest rate adjustment costs  r1 to be not too large to avoid an
unstable system following output shocks, as current inflation depends on expected future inflation
6. It is
also important to note that, if one were to estimate a reaction function such as (5), the interpretation of
the constant would be different from that in Clarida et al. (1998). Basically, our model implies that the
constant ( * *) wr A -  is a function of the real interest rate, inflation target and inflationary bias, while in
Clarida  et al. it is referred to as simply the long-run component of the real interest rate. This
demonstrates that one has to be careful in interpreting the estimated parameters of an interest rate
reaction function, as these largely depend on the assumptions one makes about the monetary
authorities’ loss function.
If there is no uncertainty about the monetary authorities’ policy objectives
7, both inflation and
interest rates will fluctuate stochastically around a given mean
8. However, in practice, the authorities’
policy goals may not be observable (see Faust and Svensson, 1998, Muscatelli 1998, 1999), and may
vary over time (see Cukierman, 1992). Suppose for instance that price and wage-setters are uncertain
about the policy-maker’s preferences over inflation (his/her credibility):
c c w w s w t t t t = + -1
2 0           ~( , ) (6)
Suppose also that the policy-maker cannot accurately predict the supply shock, but has to
forecast it (this forecast being private information), and that wage and price-setters cannot disentangle
the uncertainty due to the supply shock, e, and the preference shock
9, w. The private sector will then
perceive the interest rate reaction function as:
                                                                
6 In general the system will be stable as long as cbj r s > 1, which implies b*>1, and that the expected inflation
response to the output gap is positive. Under RE the reaction function in (5) yields the following equilibrium
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7 Muscatelli (1998a,b) analyses a model of inflation targeting with uncertain central bank preferences.
8 Given the nature of the supply shocks in the model, both inflation and interest rates will be stationary.
9 In a monetary policy committee, the preference shock, w can capture fluctuations in votes between different
‘wings’ of the committee.8




t = - + + + + - * * a a p a e a 0 1 1 2 3 1 (7)
where the a’s are functions of the same parameters (and a 1 1 >  like b*) as in (7), but with  c
e (the
expected value of  c ) and where e
f  is the forecast of the supply shock. The private sector will update
their expectations of  c  and e
f  each period on the basis of the variances of e and w in a standard
signal extraction problem  (see Cukierman, 1992, Muscatelli 1999, Walsh, 1999).
Thus, following a regime change (e.g. the central bank being granted independence), where
some parameter of the monetary authority’s objective function shifts, if the regime change was not fully
credible one would see a gradual adjustment of inflation and interest rates to a new average level.
In practice one can estimate a forward-looking reaction function for interest rates along the lines
of (7) by constructing a series for expected inflation and the expected supply shock (or equivalently the
expected output gap), using an optimal updating scheme for the expected variables (such as the
Kalman filter). If one then observes the timing of significant shifts in the estimated reaction function
parameters these should correspond to major shifts in the policymaker’s preferences (institutional
regime)
10.
It is worth noting that by estimating a simple forward-looking interest rate reaction function such
as (7), one is not trying to capture the exact way in which the monetary authorities actually react to
economic indicators which affect real economic activity and expected inflation.  Instead estimated
forward-looking reaction functions based on (7) capture the implicit way in which CB’s operational
rules/decisions translate into a reaction function in terms of expected inflation and output gaps.
Thus, for example, one might find some instability in the estimated reaction function parameters which
may not be due to a change in policy preferences (price stability), but which might be due to a shift in
                                                                
10 They might also be due to shifts in the underlying structural model which changes the way in which the
authorities form their expectations about inflation and the output gap, but in this case we should observe changes in
the models for expected inflation and the output gap.9
the intermediate targets used to achieve this outcome
11. For instance in the case of the UK, we know
that in the early 1980s there was a move away from monetary targets once it became clear that
monetary policy was becoming over-contractionary. But in general major and permanent shifts in the
estimated parameters will reflect corresponding shifts in policy preferences.
Therefore, estimating reaction functions such as (7) does not allow one to directly analyse the
authorities’ reactions to a full set of policy indicators, but it does allow one to judge whether the
operational rules have been stable and whether the reliance on certain intermediate targets has been at
the expense of meeting final output stabilisation and inflation objectives.
The theoretical literature on policy design has closely examined the performance of forward-
looking (inflation expectations) policy rules (see Haldane and Batini, 1998, Faust and Svensson, 1998,
Svensson, 1998). In part this is because of the emphasis given in some countries to the central bank’s
inflation forecast (cf. The Bank of England’s regular inflation forecast based on current interest rate
policies). In part it is because recent contributions to the inflation targeting debate (Svensson,1997b;
Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998; Haldane and Batini, 1998) have shown the quasi-optimality of interest
rate policy rules based on inflation forecasts. In general the form of the inflation forecast-based rules
considered by these authors is:
( ) * * t t j t t k t t t y y E r r r - + + + = + - l p g j q , (8)
where rt is the short-term ex ante real interest rate, rt* represents the long-run equilibrium real interest
rate, while Etpt+j is the j-period ahead inflation rate expected at t. Past values of the interest rate to
capture interest-rate smoothing behaviour and the output gap are also included
12.
This can be re-written in terms of the nominal interest rate:
( ) * t t j t t k t t y y E R R - + + + = + - l p w j a (9)
                                                                
11 This point is also stressed by Christiano  et al. (1998) in the context of VAR models.
12 Batini and Haldane (1998) note that the omission of an output gap term does not mean that the authorities do not
stabilise output, since by adjusting the degree of interest-rate smoothing and the lead in the inflation forecast one
can trade off output stabilisation against inflation stabilisation.10
where w = (1+g), while a includes the long-run real interest rate and the persistence in the
forecast of inflation.
Comparing (9) with (7) we see that, by generalising the latter to include a longer lead for
inflation, a longer lag for the interest-rate smoothing term, and substituting the output gap for the supply-
shock forecast, (7) is identical to the forecast-based policy rule in (9).
In what follows, we actually estimate reaction functions of the following type:
( ) *
1
t t j t t
k
i
i t i t y y E R R - + + + = +
=
- ￿ l p w j a , (10)
Typically we find that a maximum lag length of k=2 is sufficient to capture the degree of interest-rate
smoothing. Having estimated the basic reaction function in (10), we then search for the appropriate lead
(j) for the inflation forecast term  Et t j p + on the basis of goodness-of-fit.
As noted in Haldane and Batini (1998), the specification of reaction functions such as (10)
allows one to analyse a number of issues. First, the parameters (w, j), i.e. the weight the bank puts on
expected inflation and the lead term on it, determines the responsiveness of the instrument to changes in
the forecast and the forward-lookingness of bank’s horizon. In addition, the parameters (j, k,  j)
capture the degree of inertia in the interest rate policy. Finally, a value of l different from zero implies
that the rule explicitly includes some reaction to deviations of output from potential.
One potential problem in estimating structural reaction functions is highlighted by Favero and
Rovelli (1999), who argue that finding a significant output effect in the reaction function might simply
mean that the central bank treats the current output gap as a leading indicator for expected inflation. In
this case the output gap should be collinear with the proxy for expected inflation, or should predict
inflation forecast errors. We were not able, as explained below, to find substantial collinearity between
our measures of inflation and the output gap, while the correlation with inflation forecast errors is very11
limited and often has the wrong sign
13. Also, it is important to note that a leading indicator role for
inflation is prevalently attributed, by both central bankers ( Issing, 1997) and influential empirical
contributions (Gerlach and Svensson, 1999), to some measure of tension in the money market, rather
than to the output gap. We were however unable to detect such a role, as we shall see below.
3. Empirical Estimates
3.1 The Monetary Policy Instrument Variables
As in other recent attempts to estimate monetary authorities’ reaction functions (see Clarida et
al., 1998), we focus on short-term money market rates as the policy instrument
14. Clearly there are
difficulties in identifying a single interest rate measure as the monetary policy instrument for the whole of
our sample period (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1995). One might want to use different interest rate
measures as the policy instrument at different times (e.g. discount rates in the early part of the sample
and repo or call money rates towards the end of the sample period). But such fine distinctions would
inevitably be arbitrary, and in any case short-term money market rates will largely reflect the authorities’
monetary policy stance under different operating procedures.
3.2 Measuring Inflation Expectations and the Output Gap
There are different methods to obtain measures of inflation expectations and the output gap.
Clarida et al. (1998) use a quadratic trend to obtain a measure of potential output and hence deviations
of actual output from this trend. In order to obtain a measure of inflation expectations, Clarida et al.
(1998) use the errors-in-variables approach to modelling rational expectations whereby future actual
values are used as regressors instead of the expected values, and instrumental variable estimation is
used to take account of the presence of forecast errors.
                                                                
13 These results are not shown here for reasons of brevity, but are available from the authors upon request.
14 See the Data Appendix for details of the interest rate variables used.12
Turning first to the output gap, one disadvantage of fitting non-linear trends to the data is that
it involves using the full sample in the construction of the output trend, and hence using this filter
implicitly involves making the assumption that the policymaker has future information on the path of
output in the evaluation of the potential output trend. Rational expectations models which use the full
sample similarly do not make allowances for gradual learning by the economic agent, as might be
plausible in a situation where the monetary regime is not always constant over the sample period (see
Cuthbertson et al., 1992).
Instead we use the Structural Time Series (STS) approach proposed by Harvey (1989) to
generate series for the output gap and expected inflation. There are several advantages in using this
approach. The first is that it provides a useful and intuitive way of decomposing a series into trend and
cyclical components, which is particularly useful when one tries to estimate a series for an unobservable
trend such as potential output. Second, the modelling approach lends itself readily to using a Kalman
Filter estimation procedure, which allows one to proxy the learning process by policymakers and
economic agents. Third, the structural time series models are parsimonious models which have
reasonably rich ARIMA processes as their reduced forms.
Essentially, we estimate models for real GDP and inflation for each country, seeking to
disentangle the trend, cycle and irregular components
15. In the case of GDP, a convenient
decomposition of the series was made possible by applying the Kalman filter on the trend component.
Subsequently, the latter was computed on the basis of one-step-ahead predictions of the state vector.
This way, estimates of potential output are based only on past information, rather than on the full
sample.
In the case of inflation, we simply computed one-step-ahead prediction errors from a
univariate STS model to obtain a measure of expected and unanticipated inflation. Again, the models’13
parameters are updated only gradually, as new data is added. In both cases, the STS methodology
makes the assumption that agents make the best use of all available knowledge in a regime of imperfect
information. In contrast using a non-recursive estimation approach, such as IV errors-in-variables, has
the defect of using information from the whole sample, thus ignoring policy regime shifts.
Figure 1 compares our measure of the output gap with that obtained from a H-P filtering
procedure for one of the countries in our sample (the USA)
16. This shows that our measure differs
markedly from that used in previous studies, and indeed that quadratic or H-P trending procedures
tend to exaggerate the cyclical component. We also investigate whether the DGPs of output and
inflation in the countries of our sample have undergone any significant break over the periods we study.
If there are breaks in the underlying processes for potential output and inflation, one expects the policy
authorities to learn gradually about such shifts. Hence our Kalman Filter approach generating expected
inflation and trend output measures would be a more appropriate one than the full-information
assumption made in the existing literature.
There is now a wide range of technical contributions devoted to study trend breaks in unit roots
and the problems associated with the  endogeneity of break points
17. Here we limit ourselves to
understand whether the DGPs of output and inflation have undergone major shifts over our sample
period, leaving aside the determination of the exact number and position of the break points.  We
employ the class of tests in Hansen (1992b), and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). They all belong to
the broad category of Chow-type tests with unknown break point, and build upon the assessment of
the significance of the value of the LR, Wald and LM statistics derived from recursive switching
regressions. We use the MeanF, SupF and the Lc variants advocated by Hansen (1992b). The first
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
15 The STAMP 5.0 software was used to estimate the STS models. Output and inflation were found to be I(1), and to
have a significant cyclical component. The estimates STS models are available on request from the authors. For a
similar approach to forecasting inflation in the presence of potential structural breaks, see Stock and Watson (1999).
16 Plots of the output gaps and inflation expectations measures are not reported for reasons of space, but are
available on request. Fitting a quadratic trend, as in Clarida et al. (1998) produces a more marked cyclical pattern.
17 For an extensive account of this debate, see Stock (1994).14
two tests have parameter constancy as their null against the alternative of sudden breaks, whereas the
latter statistic is for the alternative of a smooth change. In our case, the testing strategy requires prior
estimation of univariate models for output and inflation. We adopt simple autoregressive specifications
including trends and constants when required, and the semiparametric, fully modified FM estimator of
Phillips and Hansen (1990) and Hansen (1992a). The latter is a two-step methodology that first
estimates the asymptotic covariance matrix of the system, and then provides regression parameters
18.
Tests on the null of parameter stability are finally carried out
19.
The test statistics are reported in Table 1 for all the countries we examine. In the case of
inflation, the sample covers the years 1971Q3-1997Q4, whereas for GDP some data constraints for
Sweden and New Zealand substantially shortened the sample we used. The first column of each section
displays the estimated statistic for the three tests. As regards output, stability is rejected at conventional
significance levels in all countries but Japan. In the case of inflation, the results are even more clear-cut,
with all countries displaying instability at very low significance levels. These estimates are robust to
changes in the kernel and bandwidth parameter chosen to filter the residuals, as well as to alternative
functional forms for the specified models. These results support our modelling approach.
3.3 Estimating Policy Rules
In estimating (10) the appropriate reaction lead to expected inflation (j) was usually found to
be 4 quarters for most countries. This result broadly agrees with the findings of Batini and Haldane’s
dynamic simulations of a calibrated theoretical model, where the optimum lead length on the inflation
forecast is found to lie between 3 and 6 quarters.  However, in some key cases, as we shall see,
different results emerge.
                                                                
18 Additional details on the testing procedure, as well as on the results we summarise here, can be obtained from the
authors upon request.
19 Estimates were conducted by adapting a modified GAUSS code kindly provided by Bruce Hansen. Hansen (1992b)
tabulates asymptotic critical values for each of the tests performed here.15
Lags of the dependent variable are always found to be significant. This is not surprising, as
interest rate smoothing considerations appear to be a generally accepted part of monetary policy (see
Almeida and Goodhart, 1996, Bernanke and Mihov, 1997, Goodhart, 1999). We detect a substantial
amount of policy inertia in all the countries examined.
One difference between our approach in this paper and that in other studies is that we do not
take for granted, or assume, any structural break in the behaviour of the monetary authorities. Also, we
have not imposed any particular structure for any shifts in monetary policy. This is because we want to
test whether any change can be detected in correspondence to announced regime shifts.
For this reason, we first estimated the reaction function (10) for each country over the full
sample period - extending in the G3’s case back to the end of Bretton Woods - and conducted a
recursive analysis on the magnitude and the significance of regressors. Using structural stability tests we
were then able to detect major breaks in interest rates policy. As most major shifts in interest-rate
policies took place in the 1970s or early 1980s, we then re-estimated a reaction function for each
country over the post-1980 period, and again performed recursive tests and stability analysis. This
allowed us to detect any parameter shifts in the reaction functions since 1980, and to interpret these
shifts and any structural breaks in the light of announced institutional changes or shifts in policy regime.
Finally, as in Clarida et al. (1998), we allow for the possibility that the monetary authorities
might have responded to other intermediate objectives not included in our baseline specification in (10).
The reason for doing this is two-fold. First, if the baseline model did not perform well, we can check
whether this is due to the targeting of some other intermediate objective. Second, institutional accounts
of monetary policy suggest that these other variables might matter. Lagged values of money growth,
changes in the exchange rates and influences from relevant foreign interest rates were included as
additional regressors.16
3.4 Interest Rate Reaction Functions: the G3 countries
We now turn to our empirical results. At the outset, our findings show how monetary
institutions in the G3 (the U.S., Germany and Japan) have been remarkably stable during the sample
period; i.e., the relationship between the political system and monetary institutions has not changed in
these countries
20. In the U.S. and Germany the central bank enjoys a relatively high degree of
independence (see Cukierman 1992, Grilli et al., 1991) and is best defined as a “goal independent”
central bank
21, that is, a bank which is not held accountable for achieving a certain policy target. For
instance German monetary policy has been defined as a regime of “disciplined discretion” (Laubach
and Posen, 1997), whereas monetary policy during the Greenspan era has been defined as “pre-
emptive monetary policy without an explicit nominal anchor” (Mishkin and Posen, 1997). An interesting
issue examined here is whether the success of the Fed in recent years has been achieved by changing
the way in which interest rates respond to policy objectives.
Our estimated models are reported in Tables 2-8. For ease of exposition we report only the
long-run static solutions of the model, as each regression contains one or two lags of the dependent
variable. Asymptotic standard errors are reported for each estimated coefficient. Table 2 reports the
estimated reaction function for Germany, respectively for the full sample period and since 1980. The
estimates for the whole sample show that interest rates react to inflation expectations (with a point
estimate greater than 1) and output. Adding the US Federal Funds rates marginally improves the fit of
the interest rate reaction function
22. Note that while the long run effect is only marginally significant, the
Fed funds rate appears to be important in explaining the short-run dynamics of the German money
market rate. The variable addition tests show that neither money growth nor the exchange rate
                                                                
20 Since 1979, EMS membership might have constrained the Bundesbank's ability to retain control of monetary
policy. Most discussions on the DM’s role in the EMS have concluded that  the Bundesbank largely retained her
independence (Von Hagen, 1995).
21 For instance, both Neumann (1996) and Clarida and Gertler (1997) argue that the Bundesbank pursues multiple
objectives and is flexible in attaining them, that is, emphasis sometimes shifts from one policy target to another. For a
similar view see  Mishkin and Posen (1997). For a contrasting view, stressing continuity in the Bundesbank’s use of
monetary targets, see Issing (1997).17
(measured as the DM-US$ rate) seems to exert an independent significant effect on German interest
rates. This is interesting and confirms analogous results in Clarida and Gertler (1997), and Bernanke
and Mihov (1997). Since 1971, the  Bundesbank has set target ranges for the growth of broad
monetary aggregates, but over the last fifteen years actual growth rates often exceeded (fell short of)
the upper (lower) limit of the targeted band
23. This confirms most modern accounts of the
Bundesbank’s monetary policy stance which suggest that monetary targets were not the Bank’s
primary objective but that discretionary undershoots and overshoots of the target bands were allowed
where this did not impair the achievement of the inflationary objective.
The diagnostic tests for the estimated model in Table 2 shows some signs of non-normality
(and possibly ARCH) in the residuals, but this is due to the bunching of a small number of large
residuals at the end of the 1970s, and this is apparent from the post-1980 estimates.
The estimated reaction function for Germany does not display any major shifts, with the
estimated coefficients constant across sub-samples. We also found that a four-quarter lead for
expected inflation works best for both the full sample and the post-1980 sample. Figure 2 shows 1-
step and N-step down Chow tests, as well as the estimated coefficient and standard error bands and t-
values for the expected inflation and output gap regressors for the post-1980 regression. The latter
figure shows the long-run estimated coefficient as well as the asymptotic standard errors
24. This
confirms the stability of the Bundesbank’s policy rule, but shows that the size of the estimated response
to the output gap fell after the unification shock in 1991. This shows, n line with recent work (Clarida et
al., 1998), that monetary policy in Germany reacts systematically to cyclical conditions, even though
the Bundesbank’s declared monetary strategy (see Issing, 1997) is expressed in terms of monetary
targets. Also, from 1980 onwards the overall policy thrust has gradually turned more conservative.
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
22 For a descriptive account of these effects see Mishkin and Posen (1997).
23  See Von Hagen (1995), Issing (1997).
24 These were computed using the authors’ own GAUSS routines and plotted using GiveWin.18
Whilst 1980 does mark a watershed in monetary policy in Germany, our recursive estimates uncover a
richer picture of gradual policy change.
Our estimates for the Japanese reaction function (Table 3) over the whole sample show an
insignificant coefficient on the output gap, whereas that on expected inflation is significant but well
below one. Furthermore, the equation performs poorly. We tried to improve on this by including
additional regressors. It turns out that the US Federal Funds rate exerts a strong influence on Japanese
policy. As in the case of the US (see the discussion below), instability in the reaction functions persists
in the 1980-82 period. Shortening the sample to the post-1982 period results in a dramatic increase in
the expected inflation coefficient, which suggests that the central bank’s attitude towards inflation
changed markedly. On the other hand, the recursive estimates (Figure 3) show that cyclical conditions
became important only after 1992. This confirms that in the 1980s Japanese monetary policy might
have been hamstrung by agreements on managing the value of the US$. It also confirms the casual
observation that Japanese policy might not have been sufficiently geared towards domestic targets (see
The Economist, July 17 1998), and that this might have contributed to the excessive deflation in Japan
in the 1990s.
The USA reaction function estimated over the whole sample period (Table 4) is characterised
by a coefficient on inflation which is not significantly larger than one and by a significant coefficient on
the output gap. However, diagnostic tests and recursive graphics show a marked period of instability in
the 1979-1982 period, when the Fed switched from interest rate targeting to monetary base targeting,
which implied greater instability in money market rates. Since then, the Fed has opted for the targeting
of money market (federal funds) rates
25. Goodfriend (1995) argues that the 1979-1982 parenthesis of
monetary base targeting also marked the Fed decision to aggressively clamp down on inflation
expectations which was accomplished by 1985. Most existing accounts of US monetary policy
                                                                
25  For a detailed description of how techniques of monetary control have evolved in the U.S. see Lombra (1993).19
suggests a stable environment post-1982. However, our recursive estimates show that this is not the
case. The output coefficient has the wrong sign in the mid-1980s, suggesting that real interest rates
were too low at a time when the output gap was positive. Only in the 1990s does the output coefficient
sign become positive once more.
Our estimates over the post-1980 sample in Table 4 confirm that some important changes
seem to have taken place. US policy does seem to have been less constant over time than Germany’s.
Interest rates seem to react to inflation expectations on a shorter horizon (a 2-quarter horizon is found
to work best post-1985) and with a larger coefficient when the reaction function is re-estimated over
the latter part of the sample. Our results reverse the conclusions of Clarida et al. (1998) using different
estimation methods
26, as they find an estimated coefficient on inflation which is much greater than one.
The picture changes completely if we focus on the post-1985 sample (see Table 4). The
equation is now stable, and includes a coefficient on expected inflation with a point estimate greater
than unity (although it is not significantly larger than 1). The recursive graphs also confirm that in the
1990s the Fed was adjusting real rates to follow the output cycle much more closely
27. Figure 4 shows
a significant output gap effect post-1991.
Overall, the Fed looks very different from the Bundesbank until the 1990s. On this point our
results differ sharply from those of  Clarida et al. (1998). The usual accounts suggest that, having
successfully restrained inflation expectations in 1979-82, the Fed exploited her reputation to implement
countercyclical policies. But the  Fed’s policy coefficients (particularly the output gap coefficient)
suggest that a stable and correctly-signed reaction function only operated since the early 1990s. These
                                                                
26 Mehra (1997) estimates a somewhat atheoretical reaction function, where the Fed funds rate follows an error
correction process and responds to the output cycle and to the interest rate on long term treasury bills. We added
the latter variable to our equation, but could not find any significant effect.
27 One caveat emerges from the theoretical model discussed above: in a full information context, i.e. when the private
sector has learned about the bank’s preferences, inflation expectations are highly collinear with the output cycle.
This might bias the estimated coefficient on the inflation expectations regressor downwards. On the other hand, we
find only a very small correlation between our measures of expected inflation and the output gap. The analysis of the
coefficients’covariance matrix also confirms that the correlation between the coefficients is small and often has the
wrong sign. These results are available on request.20
findings also broadly illustrate a substantive difference between the Fed’s and Bundesbank’s monetary
strategies.
The Bundesbank appears to respond more forcefully to movements in expected inflation than
the Fed judging from the inflation expectation coefficient. Some authors have suggested that this result is
open to other interpretations. Mishkin and Posen (1997) label the Fed policy as “just do it”, or pre-
emptive policy without a nominal anchor. Their argument is that monetary policy must act well in
advance of a surge in inflation expectations since the full impact of monetary policy on inflation takes
long lags. The main disadvantage of such a policy obviously lies in the difficulty of establishing a clear
policy pattern with all the risks that this implies at times when the economy is being hit by major
exogenous shocks. Our results suggest that such pragmatic and forward-looking policy should not be
interpreted as if the Fed systematically reacted to longer-term expectations, as in the Bundesbank’s
case. In fact we found that shorter leads on the expected inflation variable (2 instead of 4 quarters)
seemed to work better in the case of the US for the post-1985 sample. This confirms the casual
observation that the Fed has chosen to signal its commitment to low inflation in recent years by reacting
in advance to increases in inflationary expectations.
The other key results from this section are as follows. First, the G3 policy reaction functions
look very different. One size does not fit all, in sharp contrast to the view expressed by Chinn and
Dooley (1997). Second, despite having stable institutions, monetary policymaking in the G3 seems to
have evolved gradually in different directions: in Germany it appears to have become more conservative
post-unification. In Japan, it seems to have been led astray by inappropriate external objectives, until
recently. In the US, the highly successful countercyclical monetary policy of the Fed seems to be purely
a 1990s phenomenon. These discrepancies are not apparent in the existing empirical literature because
of the tendency to only report full-sample estimates for the 1980s.21
3.5 Interest Rate Reaction Functions: the inflation targeters
Turning to the other countries in our sample, we shall relate our results to major changes in the
way in which monetary policy was conducted. A variety of factors may cause shifts in estimated
monetary policy reaction functions. Some of them, such as highly publicised institutional innovations and
political changes are easily identified from descriptive accounts of monetary policy and will be
discussed here. Other shifts in the reaction functions may have occurred for “technical” reasons. These
include the instability of demand for money functions which eventually caused the demise of monetary
aggregates. Similarly, in other countries the authorities may have relied (formally or informally) on
indicators or intermediate objectives which were subsequently abandoned. These too are important in
understanding our results, and will be discussed as they show up in our estimates.
For most of the sample period, the central banks of the second group of countries (Canada,
New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have had limited independence in the conduct of
monetary policy compared to the CBs of the G3 countries (see Cukierman, 1992, Grilli et al., 1991).
During the 1990s explicit inflation targets were announced in all countries, but there are important
differences within the group in terms of institutional arrangements and the role the CB plays in achieving
the target. In fact only New Zealand’s CB (and to a lesser extent the UK’s CB since 1997) has been
given a legal mandate to achieve the inflation target.
In the UK, the Bank of England was only granted independence in 1997. However, there
have been several changes in monetary strategy in the last two decades. The election of the Thatcher
government in 1979 signalled a long-lasting shift in the collective attitude towards inflation
28. Instead of
adopting an institutional approach the Conservative governments tried to build a reputation for their
commitment to low inflation policies, experimenting first with monetary targets and then adopting a
more eclectic approach to intermediate objectives from the mid-1980s. After a short spell of ERM
                                                                
28  Alogoskoufis et al. (1992)  find convincing evidence of a spectacular reversal in the political business cycle after
Mrs. Thatcher came to power. For a more descriptive analysis see Minford (1993).22
membership in 1990-1992, the government then opted for a new monetary policy framework involving
the announcement of formal inflation targets. The Conservative government chose not to delegate the
implementation of monetary policy to an independent and accountable central bank. Instead the
government's own reputation was the ultimate guarantee of the policy commitment. However, the
central bank played the key role of publicly assessing the overall consistency of the policy stance
29. The
newly-elected Labour government in 1997 then sought to further bolster the inflation targeting
framework by granting the Bank of England instrument independence. Monetary policy decisions are
now taken by a newly-constituted Monetary Policy Committee.
Since the breakdown of M1 as an intermediate target in the early 1980s, until 1991 the Bank
of Canada had not committed herself to any pre-determined policy pattern, apart from the reiteration of
the long-term goal of price stability. Neither intermediate target nor time frame was apparently cast in
the attempt to pursue the long-run objective, while various monetary and credit aggregates (including
the exchange rate with the US$) were used in turn as information variables. In 1991 the government
and the bank set a sequence of year-to-year target bands for the inflation rate, so as to bring about a
gradual reduction in inflation. However, the CB was not granted a legislative mandate to achieve these
inflation targets nor was a procedure established which would hold the CB accountable for missing the
targets. The “doctrine of dual responsibility” traditionally attributes the ultimate responsibility for the
results of monetary policy to the Minister of Finance. Thus, the Bank of Canada has enjoyed only a
limited degree of formal independence (see Grilli et al., 1991, Cukierman, 1992). Nonetheless, the CB
had been calling publicly for a stricter control on inflation since 1988, while from 1994 the degree of
policy transparency has increased markedly (Mishkin and Posen, 1997).
Since 1977 Sweden had been pegging its currency unilaterally, first to a trade-weighted
basket of currencies, then switching to the ECU in May 1991. However, the strength by which this
                                                                
29 For a detailed account see Briault et al. (1995) and King (1998).23
commitment to the external anchor was pursued varied significantly, as numerous devaluations took
place (Horngren and Lindberg, 1994). To some extent the Riksbank became less accommodating to
inflation shocks after 1982. The marginal (overnight) rate was then extensively used to regulate large
currency flows during the fixed exchange rate period. After the November 1992 crisis the Riksbank
floated the Krona and announced the unilateral adoption of an inflation target in January 1993
30.
However the bank has never been granted an independent status, and political influences on the board
are important (Svensson, 1995; McCallum, 1996).
Finally, we turn to the evolution of the monetary regime in New Zealand, which switched to
inflation targeting in 1989. Historically, New Zealand's Reserve Bank had a degree of independence
which ranked lowest amongst the OECD countries (see  Grilli  et al., 1991;  Cukierman, 1992).
Correspondingly, New Zealand’s inflation rate was well above the OECD average. Up until the mid-
1980s monetary policy relied mainly on regulation and administrative controls of capital markets. From
1985 the Bank turned to a more market-oriented approach to monetary control, and based policy
decisions on a variety of indicators, such as the exchange rate, the term structure of interest rates,
monetary aggregates and output (see Fischer, 1995). The Reserve Bank Act, introduced in 1990 to
establish a legislative commitment to price stability, gave the Government and the Central Bank
Governor the mandate to agree on a policy target (it was decided that this should be an inflation target),
and explicitly contemplates the possibility of the Governor's dismissal if the set target is not met.
Figure 9 plots the expected inflation series and the ex ante real interest rates computed using
our expected inflation series for the group of inflation targeters in our study. It is interesting to note that
in the case of Sweden, Canada and New Zealand ex ante real rates appear to have turned positive
well before the announcement (represented in the charts as a vertical solid line) or the adoption of
targets. Also, inflation expectations, at least in the case of the UK, Sweden and New Zealand, seem to
                                                                
30 The term unilateral emphasises the lack of a legislative mandate to achieve a specific inflation target. See Svensson
(1995) for a detailed account of these events.24
have been somewhat subdued prior to the announced regime changes. The regime change seems to
have simply consolidated the gains in terms of lower inflation.
Our estimates for the UK (Table 5) show that over the whole sample period the coefficient on
inflation expectations is not significantly larger than 1. Furthermore, the money market interest rate
seems to have reacted to both the exchange rate and the money supply.
Given the instability in the estimated reaction function until the mid-1980s, we re-estimated the
equation for the 1985-1996 sample. This shows that the policy horizon became substantially shorter
after the 1985 Sterling crisis- interest rates reacting to one-quarter ahead expected inflation - and the
coefficient on expected inflation becomes significantly larger than one. Within this, the other minor shifts
in policy regimes are also apparent (see Figure 5). For instance, the estimated coefficient on the sterling
effective exchange rate was significant between 1988-1992, capturing both the ‘shadowing the DM’
and the ERM phases in UK policy. By contrast, the coefficients on the output gap became less
significant during the ERM phase, as domestic policy objectives were sacrificed for the external
objective.
All in all, our results closely mirror the changes in policy regimes outlined above. The main
turning point is in 1979. The more recent shifts in the estimated coefficients of the reaction function
seem to be linked to the difficulties encountered in achieving a specific target rather than a lack of
commitment to the goal of price stability.
Our estimates for Canada over the full sample period (1975-1997) yield somewhat puzzling
results (see Table 6). When the US Fed funds rate is added to the equation, both the coefficients on the
output gap and on expected inflation are not significant. Clearly, as in the case of Germany and Japan,
the Fed funds rate absorbs part of the significance of the inflation variable. Even though M1 was the
intermediate policy target in Canada between 1975 and 1982
31 (Freedman, 1995), we could not find a
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significant role for the money supply in our estimated reaction function. Furthermore, there are clear
signs of instability in the estimated function in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Re-estimating the
equation for the post-1982 sample we find that the coefficient on inflation expectations is still
insignificant, whereas effective exchange rate variations now seem to be significant alongside the Fed
funds rate.
What about the impact of inflation targets? The introduction of targets does not seem to have
caused a break in the behaviour of interest rate policy. At most there seems to have been a temporary
impact on interest rate policy just prior to the introduction of inflation targets. Figure 6 shows some
signs of instability in the expected inflation coefficient around the period 1990-1, although the N-step
down Chow tests are not significant at the 5% level. Descriptive accounts of Canadian monetary policy
in this period (Mishkin and Posen, 1997) point out that the inflation target was used as a guidance for
expectations, but stress that in several occasions monetary policy was in fact constrained to react to
external conditions, such as exchange rate developments and the behaviour of US monetary policy.
Our estimated reaction function seems to confirm this. Furthermore, the Bank has recently
defined a short-run operational target, the index of monetary conditions (MCI). MCI changes include
variations in a short-term interest rate and in the trade-weighted exchange rate. Clearly, this highlights
the importance of external constraints on the Bank of Canada’s policy stance.
The full-sample estimates (1980-97) for Sweden show a significant but relatively low
coefficient on expected inflation, while the output gap is not significant at all (see Table 7). The main
instability in the estimated reaction function corresponds to the time of the ERM crisis in 1992.
Monetary policy in Sweden has been externally tied to the ERM until 1992, when the krona was
forced to devaluate notwithstanding an unprecedented surge in domestic interest rates. Sweden has
moved to inflation targeting since then. However, Svensson (1995) points out that the credibility of the
new regime has been hampered by a number of factors, such as the deep political divisions over the26
conduct of monetary policy and the relatively large budget deficits. The sudden policy reversals and the
overall uncertainty about the post-1992 regime clearly show up in our estimates, making it difficult to
detect a clear policy pattern.
Once a dummy is included for the ERM crisis in 1992, the coefficient on expected inflation
rises and becomes more significant, but the point estimate remains below one, and the output gap
variable is almost significant at the 5% level. However, we are unable to find signs of a significant
permanent shift in the reaction function following the introduction of inflation targets. The main story that
emerges from Figure 7 is (as for the UK) the decreasing importance of domestic inflation and output
targets just before the ERM crisis in 1992. On the other hand, since inflation did in fact fall in Sweden,
one might conclude that monetary policy in this period is best defined as keeping real interest rates high
until inflation was brought down. Taking into account the severe credibility constraints outlined above,
this apparently stubborn policy was perhaps the only alternative left to the bank in order to signal her
willingness to curb inflation.
New Zealand has been the most often cited inflation targeting experiment, not least because in
this case the legal arrangements designed to regulate the bank activity follow the prescriptions of
monetary policy design theory more closely than elsewhere (see Walsh, 1995). The estimated equation
for the full sample (see Table 8, Figure 8) shows that interest rates seem to have reacted only to
expected inflation - the estimated coefficient is close to be significantly larger than 1 - whereas domestic
cyclical conditions do not seem to matter much
32. Even though exchange rate shocks are explicitly cited
in the Bank contract as a possible justification for deviating from the announced policy, we could not
find a significant exchange rate effect. On the other hand diagnostic tests signal some ARCH pattern in
the residuals. This may be due to occasional interest rate adjustments to external conditions. Another
possible explanation is found in the exceedingly narrow band originally set around the inflation target,27
which caused significant instrument instability in a futile effort to “fine tune” inflation control
33 (Mishkin
and Posen, 1997). Once again, the key result from the stability tests is that in the ‘90s the Reserve
Bank followed a policy pattern which was already been established in the former decade. The stability
of the inflation expectations coefficient and of the overall equation indicates that the inflation target
regime did not seem to make a marked difference to interest rate policy. The other main point to note is
that inflation targeting does not seem to have allowed the authority a greater leeway to stabilise output
fluctuations.
5.  Conclusions
In this paper we estimate forward-looking interest rate reaction functions for the G3
economies and for a group of countries which recently adopted explicit inflation targets and central
bank reforms as the centrepiece of their monetary strategies. In addition to the detailed results for each
country set out above, a number of general conclusions emerge from our empirical results.
First, with the exception of the UK, the recent switch to inflation targets seems to have made
little difference to interest rate policy in the group of inflation targeters. In practice it seems that any
major changes in the responsiveness of interest rates to expected inflation took place well before the
adoption of inflation targets or before the change towards greater central bank independence which
occurred in some of these countries (New Zealand, Canada). The obvious conclusion is that the new
regimes were brought in to consolidate gains in terms of lower inflation. Only time will tell if, in response
to major exogenous shocks, monetary policy will respond more vigorously to inflationary forces than in
the past. In the case of the UK we do detect a shift in policy stance as changes in targeting regimes
took place. Since 1992, a stable reaction function seems to be in place.
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
32 Hutchison and Walsh (1998) suggested that the Reserve Bank looked at output stabilisation as an additional
objective, but the output gap term is not significant in our estimates. Nevertheless, as pointed out previously, the
absence of an output gap term in the reaction function does not preclude some degree of output stabilisation.
33 Perhaps not surprisingly, both the inflation target and the band width were revised in the ‘90s28
Second, in countries where there were explicit intermediate targets (such as monetary
aggregates in Germany) these are usually used as an anchor for expectations, but this does not
necessarily imply that policy is strictly constrained to follow them in practice. Monetary policy often
follows a broader set of objectives. Our results confirm those of previous researchers who find that in
practice the Bundesbank targets inflation and output and reacts to external conditions.
Third, where the policy-maker is subject to some implicit constraint due to external conditions
(as in the case of Canada and Japan) this can sometimes lead to a less clear picture regarding the
monetary authorities’ response to expected inflation and to the cycle.
Fourth, even in G3 countries where there have been no central bank or other institutional
reforms (e.g. the US, Japan), we find that policies did evolve to a considerable degree in the 1980s and
1990s. Only since the 1990s do these countries begin to resemble the Bundesbank in terms of their
estimated interest rate reaction functions.
Fifth, with the exception of Germany and the UK (since 1992), most of the monetary
authorities in our sample do not seem to follow stable simple forward-looking policy reaction functions
based on output gaps and expected inflation (and, a fortiori, Taylor rules). This suggests that caution
has to be exercised in using an inflation targeting framework to model the preferences of the monetary
authorities (see Clarida et al., 1998, Favero and Rovelli, 1999).
Finally, we should focus on some important differences in the behaviour of central banks
regarding output stabilisation. On the one hand in the US we seem to have the apparent ‘just do it’
attitude of the Fed, who since 1990 exploits her reputation to focus on the cycle, bolstered to some
extend by a shorter horizon on expected inflation in the estimated reaction function. At the other
extreme there are those monetary authorities who feel that yet have to build up a reputation: e.g. the
Swedish Riksbank’s stubborn attempt to lower inflation expectations by means of high interest rates
and the apparently exclusive focus of the Bank of New Zealand on domestic inflation. Whether this29
‘reputation-building’ phase will also apply to central banks which have only recently acquired their
independence, such as the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, remains an open question.
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Table 1  – Tests for parameter instability. Lc, MeanF, SupF are defined as testing the null of stability against
nonconstancy on the parameters of univariate autoregressive models for inflation (4-quarter change in CPI) and real
GDP. Constants and linear time trends where included when relevant.  *, **, and *** indicate significance of the







LC 0.548* 0.543* 1.762***
MeanF 7.946** 10.713*** 9.495***
SupF 23.682*** 68.269*** 48.400***
Germany
LC 0.339 1.553*** 0.651**
MeanF 4.931 14.422*** 8.195***
SupF 47.889*** 25.059*** 58.105***
Japan
LC 0.193 0.743** 0.998***
MeanF 4.186 5.913* 7.987***
SupF 8.647 29.530*** 28.035***
United Kingdom
LC 0.514* 0.624** 2.049***
MeanF 13.150*** 5.915** 11.247***
SupF 43.787*** 29.530*** 48.371***
Canada
LC 0.254 1.406*** 1.383***
MeanF 5.449* 12.803*** 12.5***
SupF 24.662*** 49.207*** 55.908***
Sweden
LC 0.334 1.137*** 0.959***
MeanF 7.846** 10.848*** 24.192***
SupF 14.731* 31.085*** 73.784***
New Zealand
LC 0.481* 1.097*** 0.484*
MeanF 9.047*** 21.772*** 8.051***


























































AR 1- 5 F( 5, 97)
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 95)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 92)
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*Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 4-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
**As for the note above, but now with two lags of the Fed Funds Rate on the RHS.
***We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth and changes in the current and lagged exchange rate vis-a-vis the US$ were tested by a F-version of the Wald test. P-
values in brackets.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. AR is a LM test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH structure, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the



























































AR 1- 5 F( 5, 90)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 87)
Normality c
2(2)












AR 1- 5 F( 5, 89)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 86)
Normality c
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 53)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 50)
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 48)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 45)
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*Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 4-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and two lags of the dependent variable.
**As  for the note above, but now with one lag of the Fed Funds Rate on the RHS.
***We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth and changes in the current, one- and twice-lagged trade weighted exchange rate were tested by a F-version of the
Wald test. P-values in brackets.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. AR is a LM test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH structure, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the
normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional mis-specification. P-values in brackets.4
Sample












































AR 1- 5 F( 5, 90)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 87)
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 57)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 54)
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 40)
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*Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 4-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and two lags of the dependent variable.
** Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 2-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
***We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth and changes in a lagged trade-weighted index of effective exchange rate were tested by a F-version of the Wald test on
the baseline model augmented of each new variable. P-values in brackets.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. AR is a LM test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals have an ARCH structure, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the
normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional mis-specification. P-values in brackets.5
Sample
Regressor 1975Q3-1996Q3 1980Q1-1996Q3 1985Q1-1996Q3
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 76)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 73)
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 75)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 72)
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 58)
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AR 1- 5 F( 5, 38)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 35)
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Table 5. United Kingdom
*Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 4-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
**Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 4-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and the current trade-weighted index of effective exchange rate.
***Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, one-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and one lag of the dependent variable.
****We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth (both M4 and M1), changes in the current and lagged trade-weighted index of effective exchange rate and current
and lagged 3-month German FIBOR were tested by a F-version of the Wald test. P-values in brackets.6
Sample
Regressor 1975Q3-1996Q2 1975Q3-1996Q2 1982Q1-1996Q2











































AR 1- 4 F( 4, 72)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 68)
Normality c
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AR 1- 4 F( 4, 74)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 70)
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AR 1- 4 F( 4, 47)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 43)
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*Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 4-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and two lags of the dependent variable.
**Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 4-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap, two lags of the dependent variable and the current Fed Funds Rate.
***Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, 4-quarter ahead expected inflation, current and lagged output gap, one lag of the dependent variable and current Fed Funds Rate.
****We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth and changes in the current and lagged trade-weighted index of effective exchange rate were tested by a F-version of
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AR 1- 4 F( 4, 52)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 48)
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AR 1- 4 F( 4, 51)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 47)
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*Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, one-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and one lag of the
dependent variable.
**Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, one-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and a dummy
variable assuming value one in the third and fourth quarter on 1992 and zero elsewhere, and one lag of the dependent variable.
***We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth, changes in the current and lagged trade-
weighted index of effective exchange rate and current and lagged 3-month German FIBOR were tested by a F-version of the Wald test. P-
values in brackets.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. AR is a LM test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals
have an ARCH structure, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no functional mis-
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AR 1- 4 F( 4, 51)
ARCH 4  F( 4, 47)
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Table 8. New Zealand
*Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, one-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and one lag of
the dependent variable.
**Derived from a RLS regression of the interest rate on a constant, two-quarter ahead expected inflation, output gap and one lag of
the dependent variable.
***We tested for the addition of other regressors. Zero restrictions on lagged money growth, changes in the current and lagged trade-
weighted index of effective exchange rate were tested by a F-version of the Wald test. P-values in brackets.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. AR is a LM test for the hypothesis of no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether
residuals have an ARCH structure, with no ARCH as the null; Normality tests the normality of residuals; RESET tests the null of no
functional mis-specification. P-values in bracketsi
Figure 1: Hodrick-Prescott and Filtered STS Measures of the Output Gap









Figure 2. Germany. 1980(1)-1996(4). Recursive coefficients and standard error bands; 1-step, N-step up Chow tests
(5%)
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Figure 5. United Kingdom. 1980(1)-1996(3). Recursive coefficients and standard error bands; t-ratio for the exchange
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Figure 6. Canada. 1982(2)-1996(2). Recursive coefficients and standard error bands; 1-step, N-step up Chow tests
(5%)
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Figure 9- United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, New Zealand
Ex ante real interest rates (solid lines) and (4-quarter ahead) expected inflation (dotted lines). The vertical lines
represent the announcement of inflation targetsi
Data Appendix
The data we used were quarterly series, extracted from OECD Main
Economic Indicators, apart from a few cases, in which the source is equivalently
quoted. In most cases we were able to employ seasonally adjusted data.
For each country we measured output using the GDP at constant
prices series. For Sweden and New Zealand the available constant price series
for GDP do not date back further than 1980 and 1982Q2, respectively.  The
inflation series were defined as simple 4-quarter log-differences in the all-
items CPI, except for Britain, where it was the equivalent change in the index
of retail prices excluding mortgage interest payments (not available before
1975).
The index of effective exchange rates (trade weighted) was the measure for the
exchange rates. Also, spot exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar were tried for Japan,
Germany, Canada, New Zealand and the UK; vis-a-vis the German mark for the UK
and Sweden.
The rate on US Federal Funds was used as the foreign interest rate for
Japan, Germany, Canada and New Zealand. The 3-month FIBOR German rate
was the foreign rate for the UK and Sweden.
Below we briefly outline the short-term interest rates we chose as
policy indicators, along with the monetary aggregates we applied in the
generation of  regressors. The rates are generally converted from monthly
series.ii
Country Modelled Interest Rate Variable Money
USA
Federal Funds Rate. As noted in the main text, during the early to mid-80s the FFR provides
an accurate measure of the  Fed’s policy stance. The only exception is the  Volcker
experiment in the 1979-82 period, when the Fed’s operating procedures could be better




The Call Money Rate (rate between financial institutions, source Bank of Japan) is directly
affected by the Bank of Japan reserve management policy, through discount window and




The Bundesbank’s intentions are mainly reflected by the rate in the market for interbank
reserves, the Call Money Rate. In facts, the discount window lending to commercial banks
exclusively affected the behaviour of this rate until 1985, when the banks started to be
supplied with reserves by repurchase operations. Since then the call rate shadows the rate on
these loans (REPO rate). (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1997; Clarida and Gertler, 1997)
M3*
UK
We use an Overnight Interbank Rate series post-1983. This is not available pre-1983, and
we use the Rate on 90-day Treasury Bills , which displays a very close correlation with the
interbank lending rate, for those observations (source: IMF, IFS). M4
CANADA
The Bank of Canada introduced in 1996 the concept of Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)
as its short-run operational target. The changes in the index are defined as a weighted
average of the changes in the 90-day commercial paper rate and the changes in a trade-
weighted Can$ exchange rate. Although the MCI was computed backward and onward from
1987, the Overnight Money Market Rate (available from 1975) is clearly a superior




During the fixed exchange rate regime the overnight rate in the  interbank market
represented the Riksbank’s favourite instrument to keep the desired krona’s parity. Then,
after the switch to the inflation targeting regime, the Repo rate has become the Bank’s
operational instrument. The sake of homogeneity and continuity suggested to use the Rate
on 3-month Treasury Discount Notes (not available before 1982), which roughly shadows




The Rate on 90-day Bank Bills (not available before 1974) was our choice. Until March
1985 New Zealand has pursued a policy of adjustable pegged exchange rate. “…the
instrument since 1985 has been the quantity target for settlement balances held at the
Reserve Bank. Settlement cash is used by commercial banks for end-of-day settlements with
each other and the government. Should the banks run out of cash during the settlement
period, further cash is available from the Reserve Bank by discounting Reserve Bank bills
of short maturity at a penalty rate of 1.5% above market rates…Such an approach allows
interest rates to move quickly, particularly when the change involves a politically unpopular
increase in interest rates…” (Fischer, 1995, page35) It is then understandable why banks
prefer to act in the bank bills market, whose short-term interest rate tends to react rapidly to
changes in policy intentions.
M1
*The Bundesbank announced targets for the growth of Central Bank Money until 1987, when it switched to M3,
which we chose. The two move very closely together, apart from two episodes of divergence in 1988 and 1990-91.
Notwithstanding the official target is announced in terms of base-money growth, the evidence points to Germany
as to an “atypical” inflation targeter, who influences the money markets through changes in a day-to-day rate
(Neumann and von Hagen, 1993; von Hagen, 1995; Bernanke and Mihov, 1997; Mishkin and Posen, 1997).
** Until 1982 the Bank of Canada was committed to target M1. It is now following closely also the
behaviour of M2+ to get some clues about future inflation (Freedman, 1995).